Menfi’s Intelligence Decision Faces Legal Challenge After Koni’s Denial and Parliament’s Objection
Libya – A move by Presidential Council Chairman Mohamed al-Menfi to change the leadership of the Libyan Intelligence Service has triggered a legal and institutional dispute after his deputy, Moussa al-Koni, denied that the council had reached any consensus on the decision, while House of Representatives Speaker Aguila Saleh maintained that appointing or dismissing the intelligence chief cannot take legal effect without parliamentary approval under the legislation governing the agency.
The publicly stated positions place Menfi’s decision before two fundamental legal obstacles. The first concerns the decision-making mechanism within the Presidential Council, which operates as a collective authority, while the second relates to the requirement that parliament approve any change to the leadership of the intelligence service.
Disputed Claim of Unanimous Approval
The controversy began after a statement issued in the name of the Presidential Council on June 28 said a meeting had been held following a prior invitation, while claiming that Koni remained absent because he was outside the country.
The statement said the council discussed the items on its agenda and unanimously approved the decisions presented to it, citing its constitutional and sovereign responsibilities and its role as the country’s head of state and supreme commander.
Although the published statement did not disclose the details of the decisions or identify the positions concerned, it stressed that the presidency, in its capacity as supreme commander, was required to take measures related to sovereign affairs.
It also linked the decisions to the need for state institutions to operate permanently and regularly from their official headquarters in Tripoli.
However, the claim of unanimous approval was promptly challenged by Koni, who denied both his alleged absence and his approval of the proposed decisions.
Koni: I Attended and Rejected the Proposals
Koni said he participated in the meeting remotely at 1:00 p.m. after receiving the invitation in advance, directly contradicting the council statement’s assertion that he had been absent.
He disclosed that the meeting included extensive discussions on naming a new head of the General Intelligence Service and a new chief of general staff.
Koni said proposals had been put forward and that there had been insistence on pushing them through, but no agreement or consensus was ultimately reached.
He stressed that he had not approved any of the proposals and that no decision had been adopted by consensus or unanimity in accordance with the legal mechanisms governing the Presidential Council’s work.
The dispute therefore extends beyond political interpretation to a central factual question concerning the participation and position of the council’s third member.
According to Koni’s account, his attendance and explicit rejection of the proposals undermine the description of the decisions as having been unanimously approved.
A Collective Authority, Not an Individual Presidency
Koni maintained that the Presidential Council exercises its powers as a collective authority and that decisions, particularly those involving sovereign positions, acquire no legal or institutional effect unless they are discussed and approved through the established procedures and recorded in an officially certified meeting report.
He described attributing positions or approvals to him that he had never expressed as a serious breach of institutional responsibility, a deception of public opinion and a blow to the council’s credibility.
Koni also announced that all necessary legal measures would be taken against any decisions or recommendations issued in violation of those procedures, and that such decisions would be treated as null and void.
His position reinforces the argument that Menfi’s status as chairman does not entitle him to replace the council as a whole or independently issue a sovereign decision that failed to secure the required agreement among its members.
Aguila Saleh Enters the Dispute
House of Representatives Speaker Aguila Saleh also intervened, warning against drawing sovereign security institutions into political disputes and rivalries.
Saleh said the sensitivity and national standing of those institutions required shielding them from political conflict to ensure that they continued performing their duties professionally and impartially.
He argued that raising the issue of changing security chiefs at such a sensitive time could only contribute to reshuffling the political cards, disrupting the broader scene, creating new crises and deepening the division.
Such moves, he warned, could obstruct ongoing political efforts aimed at unifying state institutions and preparing the ground for elections.
Parliamentary Approval Required
Saleh set out a more detailed legal objection in a letter addressed to the heads and directors of intelligence agencies in friendly and allied countries.
He said the House of Representatives had adopted major amendments to the legislation governing the Libyan Intelligence Service more than three years ago.
Under those amendments, the appointment or dismissal of the intelligence chief does not take effect unless it is submitted to the House of Representatives and approved during a formal session with a legal quorum of at least 120 lawmakers.
According to the letter, this requirement was introduced to ensure that decisions concerning senior sovereign and security positions reflect a broad national will rather than the unilateral choice of one authority or individual.
Consequently, even if a Presidential Council decision were procedurally sound internally, it would still require parliamentary approval before producing legal effect, according to the House of Representatives’ position.
Menfi’s Account Contradicted by Koni’s Statement
Koni’s statement creates a clear contradiction with the account published in the name of the Presidential Council.
The council’s statement said Koni had been absent and that the decisions had been approved unanimously, while Koni said he had participated in the meeting and expressly rejected the proposals.
This contradiction is not a minor procedural detail. Establishing that Koni attended and objected would undermine the central basis on which the decisions were presented to the public as collectively and unanimously adopted.
The absence of a published and officially certified meeting report detailing attendance, deliberations and voting further deepens uncertainty over the procedural basis used to announce the decision.
Supreme Commander Powers Do Not Override Collective Procedures
The Presidential Council’s statement invoked the presidency’s status as head of state and supreme commander to justify decisions related to sovereign affairs.
The opposing legal argument, however, distinguishes between the council possessing a particular power and the lawful procedure through which that power must be exercised.
Under Koni’s interpretation, the Presidential Council is a collective body that cannot be reduced to its chairman, and its shared powers do not become individual powers merely because the issue concerns sovereign affairs.
The legislation governing the intelligence service, according to the House of Representatives, adds a further legal stage by requiring parliamentary approval for the appointment or dismissal of the agency’s chief.
Warnings Against Imposing a Fait Accompli
In his correspondence, Saleh warned against attempts to impose changes within the intelligence service through executive backing or by creating facts on the ground.
He described such actions as an infringement of legality and the independence of sovereign institutions.
Saleh said the leadership recognised by parliament derives its legitimacy from the laws in force and established constitutional procedures, and may continue performing its duties from any Libyan city until the state restores its authority and security across the entire country.
The fact that the letter was sent to foreign intelligence agencies indicates that the dispute has moved beyond the domestic political arena and into an effort to determine which leadership should be recognised internationally as the lawful authority of the service.
Risk of Dividing the Intelligence Service
Persisting with the disputed decision could result in two competing leaderships, each claiming legitimacy.
One could rely on a decision backed by the chairman of the Presidential Council, while the other could invoke existing legislation and the position of the House of Representatives.
Such a situation could disrupt the agency’s operations and foreign relationships and increase the risk of dividing a sovereign security institution that is supposed to remain outside political and regional rivalries.
It could also transform the dispute from a legal disagreement into a struggle over headquarters, authority and chains of command.
A Decision Lacking Consensus and Parliamentary Approval
Based on the statements and correspondence made public, the decision to change the head of the Libyan Intelligence Service faces fundamental procedural and legal deficiencies.
One member of the Presidential Council has denied approving it and maintained that it was not adopted by consensus, while the House of Representatives insists that it cannot take effect without formal approval at a session attended by at least 120 lawmakers.
In the absence of a certified meeting report establishing that the decision was adopted through the legally prescribed process, and without Koni’s approval or parliamentary endorsement, the move appears closer to a unilateral decision than a fully constituted act of the Presidential Council as a collective authority.
Resolving the dispute will therefore require publication of the official meeting record, clarification of the legal basis for the decision and an assessment of its compatibility with both the laws governing the intelligence service and the procedures regulating decision-making within the Presidential Council.
